

TITLE: The role of collaborative governance network for building adaptive capacity in the Galapagos small-scale fishing sector.

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1 TITLE: The role of collaborative governance network for building adaptive capacity in the
2 Galapagos small-scale fishing sector.

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4 KEYWORDS: Adaptive Capacity; Social Network Analysis; Small-scale fisheries.

5
6 ABSTRACT

7
8 Collaborative forms of governance have a key role in building adaptive capacity in small-scale
9 fishery systems. However, governance systems' structures and features are usually ignored,
10 reducing opportunities to improve collaboration among multiple actors to cope with adverse
11 drivers of change and enlarge trust in decision-making. This study used a social network analysis
12 approach, based on descriptive statistics and exponential random graph models (ERGMs), to
13 examine specific network patterns and configurations that may strengthen collaboration links in
14 the Galapagos small-scale fishery governance system. We explored four main research questions:
15 how do the collaborative ties in the Galapagos small-scale fishing governance system interact,
16 which are the central and bridging organizations and agencies within the Galapagos small-scale
17 fishery governance system, what are the organizational links of the Galapagos small-scale fishery
18 governance system and their frequencies, and is there a tendency toward reciprocity, popularity,
19 and sender-and-receiver network formations in the Galapagos small-scale fishery governance
20 system? Our findings suggest a cross-level and cross-sectoral interaction between various
21 organizations and agencies in the Galapagos small-scale fishery system. We identified central and
22 well-positioned actors and network configurations whose interactions might be fundamental to
23 strengthen the small-scale fishing sector's adaptive capacity to face future crises caused by novel
24 pandemics, climate change or other anthropogenic and climate drivers of change.

25
26 1.1 INTRODUCTION

27
28 Small-scale fisheries are complex socio-ecological systems that evolve according to human
29 behaviours and attitudes, environmental and development conditions, and other circumstances. An
30 increasing number of natural and human-induced drivers of change, such as climate change,
31 globalization, novel global pandemics such as COVID-19, illegal fishing, economic crises, and
32 overexploitation of resources, are causing unprecedented consequences throughout small-scale
33 fisheries in Latin America and the Caribbean, pushing them into socio-economic situations never
34 before experienced (Escobar-Camacho et al., 2021). The dynamics and interactions of small-scale
35 fishery systems are continually changing, particularly during a period where multiple drivers of
36 change coincide (DeWitte et al., 2017; Lubell and Morrison, 2021). This reality triggers various
37 rapid and transboundary management problems derived from different geneses charged with

38 uncertainty and complexity, involving actors from several sectors, governance levels, and
39 geographical scales. Consequently, it becomes increasingly challenging to align the governance
40 structures scale to the problems they are meant to address (Bodin, 2017; Epstein et al., 2015;
41 Kininmonth et al., 2015; Rijke et al., 2012) and build adaptive capacity.

42

43 Building adaptive capacity in small-scale fishery systems largely depends on the coordination,
44 collaboration, and interdependencies between diverse actors, including resource users, managers,
45 scientists, and non-governmental organizations (Johnson et al., 2020). The lack of communication
46 and collaboration among these actors, together with a limited alignment (fit) between governance
47 systems and socio-ecological dimensions, often results in a series of detrimental effects on small-
48 scale fisheries (Bodin et al., 2014; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Pittman et al., 2015). These effects include
49 overfishing of fishery resources, habitat fragmentation, and biodiversity loss, which affect fishers'
50 livelihoods, giving rise to "the tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968). Disregarding governance
51 systems' structures and features exacerbates the problem of alignment fit in complex socio-
52 ecological systems. Consequently, building adaptive capacity also becomes increasingly
53 challenging.

54

55 Collaborative network approaches may offer possible solutions to building adaptive capacity in
56 small-scale fisheries (Berkes, 2010; Levy and Lubell, 2018) through participation, connectivity,
57 and experimentation across actors, sectors, scales, and levels (Guerrero et al., 2015). This research
58 and management approach bolsters opportunities for communication (Barnes et al., 2019), the
59 creation of social learning (Bodin, 2017), trust-building (Bodin et al., 2020; Mcallister et al.,
60 2017), the co-production of knowledge (Crona and Bodin, 2006; Kowalski and Jenkins, 2015),
61 institutional building (Armitage et al., 2009; Berkes, 2009), and conflict resolution (Hahn et al.,
62 2006), among other central elements for building adaptive capacity in socio-ecological systems. In
63 this paper, we argue that unveiling the structure of governance systems' networks enables
64 practitioners and decision-makers to understand the institutions and actors comprising those
65 governance systems and their interactions. This allows, among other things, for planning actions
66 strategically and revealing options for improved collaboration between governmental institutions,
67 fishers, and civil society to cope with adverse drivers of change and build trust in the decision-
68 making process, e.g., facilitating and accelerating the provisions of support and the delivery of
69 mitigation measures in times of crisis (e.g., during pandemics) and the diffusion of crucial
70 information and knowledge in governance systems.

71

72 The configuration of a governance system network relies on several historical, environmental,
73 cultural, economic and social factors whose interactions might give rise to various network
74 configurations, different connections, and, consequently, likely diverse interpretations (Groce et

2

75 al., 2018; Lusher et al., 2012). The social network analysis represents an analytical framework to
76 represent, capture, and unveil relationships and interdependencies in social and ecological
77 environments (Borgatti et al., 2009; Ingold et al., 2018; Sayles et al., 2019). In this paper, we used
78 a social network analysis approach to examine specific network patterns and configurations that
79 may strengthen collaboration links in the small-scale fishery governance system of Galapagos.
80 Such knowledge could be used by decision-makers as input to design and implement management
81 actions and strategies to improve the adaptive capacity of the Galapagos small-scale fishery sector
82 against multiple drivers of change.

83

84 Our social network analysis is based on descriptive statistics (centrality measures) and exponential
85 random graph models (ERGMs), a statistical approach for assessing if certain network
86 configurations are more prevalent or not in a network than would occur by chance alone according
87 to the presence or absence of links among actors, actors' attributes, and network parameters in an
88 observed network (Bodin et al., 2014; Bodin and Tengö, 2012; Guerrero et al., 2015; Kininmonth
89 et al., 2015; Lusher et al., 2012; Pittman and Armitage, 2019; Shumate and Palazzolo, 2010). We
90 followed this approach to explore: (1) central and bridging organizations and agencies within the
91 Galapagos small-scale fishery governance system, (2) the frequency and organizational links of
92 the Galapagos small-scale fishery governance system, and (3) the tendency toward reciprocity,
93 popularity, and sender-and-receiver network formations within the Galapagos small-scale fishery
94 governance system. To analyze network configurations, we used the term "nodes" to refer to those
95 organizations and agencies connected to the Galapagos small-scale fishery sector through
96 different links or ties, represented by actions of coordination, communication and work among
97 organizations. On the other hand, the term "connectivity" refers to the links or ties of one
98 organization to other organizations and agencies. We used both terms to describe the Galapagos
99 small-scale fishery governance system as a governance system network.

100

101 In response to the growing need for decision-makers and policymakers to act during unexpected
102 and rapid changes, the concept of adaptive capacity has gained popularity in policymaking and
103 public policy discourses to illustrate ways to make a governance system more robust to adverse
104 shocks. Adaptive capacity refers to the conditions that enable a system of interest to anticipate and
105 respond proactively to diverse shocks, reduce the adverse consequences, recover and take
106 advantage of new opportunities (Cinner et al., 2018; Engle, 2011; Folke et al., 2002; Whitney et
107 al., 2017). Here, we argue that governance systems often represent the structures by which public
108 and private institutions solve societal problems and build societal opportunities (Kooiman, 2003).
109 Therefore, the study of governance systems structures and their features become increasingly
110 necessary to bolster the capacity of complex socio-ecological systems to adapt (Armitage and

111 Plummer, 2010a; Emerson and Gerlak, 2015; Folke et al., 2005; Gupta et al., 2010; Pahl-Wostl,
112 2009).

113

114 Solving wicked problems spanning complex social-ecological systems such as small-scale
115 fisheries governance systems requires multi-level cooperation to deliver appropriate policy
116 solutions for complex social-ecological issues (Lubell and Morrison, 2021). Collaborative
117 approaches are platforms to foster participation from various actors, providing expertise,
118 flexibility, and experimentation from multiple sectors, and levels in light of rapid changes and
119 uncertainty (Bodin, 2017). Although it is often hard to coordinate various organizations to manage
120 common-pool resources because of social-ecological systems' socio-economic and political
121 realities, impacting the future of a shared resource requires an initial understanding of how actors
122 and stakeholders from various sectors, scales, and levels tend to interact within governance
123 systems to propose actions, policies and strategies. Disregarding the latter might limit the cross-
124 sectoral and cross-level interactions required to make decision-making structures operational and,
125 therefore, strengthen the adaptive capacity of a system of concern. In Olsson's (2006) terms, the
126 problem's elements correspond to the preparatory efforts to achieve a desirable social-ecological
127 system state.

128

129 Connecting organizations and agencies from different sectors and administrative levels—often
130 with opposing views and interests—is challenging (Baird et al., 2019; Mcallister et al., 2017).
131 However, strengthening the capacity of a complex social-ecological system to adapt is more a
132 matter of learning, collaboration, cooperation, conflict resolution, and flexibility than prediction
133 and control (Armitage et al., 2007; Bodin et al., 2020). Therefore, unveiling collaborative
134 governance network patterns and configurations are significant—not only to contribute to,
135 anticipate, and respond to multidimensional and uncertain changes that may occur across sectors,
136 geographical scales and administrative levels—but also for equilibrating institutional objectives,
137 strategies, and power distribution between the individuals we deem central figures in building
138 adaptive capacity (Armitage and Plummer, 2010b; Keskitalo and Kulyasova, 2009; Morrison et
139 al., 2019).

140

141

142 2.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT

143

144 Our study focuses on the small-scale fishery sector from the Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR),
145 Ecuador. In this multiple-use marine protected area, research efforts have often centred mainly on
146 biological and ecological perspectives over human and social dimensions, ignoring the role of
147 existing collaborative approaches in building adaptive capacity (Barragán Paladines and

148 Chuenpagdee, 2015; González et al., 2008; Quiroga, 2013; Watkins, 2008). The Galapagos
149 Islands, known for being the natural laboratory in Charles Darwin's research on the theory of
150 evolution, are located 1200 kilometres off the Ecuadorian coastline (Figure 1). Tourism and
151 fishing are the main economic sectors in the archipelago. Both have encouraged human population
152 growth (approximately 30,000 people) and tourism growth (271,238 tourists annually before the
153 COVID-19 pandemic) (DPNG, 2021). Large-scale fishing was prohibited in 1998 when the GMR
154 was created. Since then, local small-scale fishers were allocated exclusive access rights to
155 Galapagos fishery resources.

156

157 The Galapagos small-scale fishery sector plays an essential role for the economy and food security
158 in the Galapagos Islands, being a food supplier for the local population, hotels and vessels
159 operating in Galapagos (Barragán P., 2015; Cavole et al., 2020). Today, 1100 fishers are
160 registered in the Galapagos National Park fishing record, of which approximately 400 are active
161 fishers (Burbano and Meredith, 2020). Although the fishing sector has been significant in the
162 development of the Galapagos since the occupation of the islands, the Galapagos marine
163 exploration has brought different social and ecological conflicts that have led to the establishment
164 of diverse public and private organizations and agencies at various geographical and jurisdictional
165 scales and levels (Castrejón et al., 2014). The expansion of the spiny lobster fishery, the Chinese
166 market's growing demand for shark fins, the collapse of the sea cucumber (*Isostichopus fuscus*)
167 fishery in the 1980s and 1990s, together with the adoption of the so-called Galapagos Special Law
168 (GSL) to protect the marine resources of the islands in 1998, eventually prompted the
169 establishment and presence of various governmental, scientific and non-governmental
170 organizations, for either management and control, conservation reasons or commercial ends in
171 Galapagos (Castrejón et al., 2014).

172

173 Today, five artisanal fishing cooperatives operate in the Galapagos Islands, known by their
174 Spanish acronyms COPROPAG, COPESPROMAR, COPESAN, COPAHISA and
175 ASOARMAPESBAY. Artisanal fishing cooperatives target more than 68 marine species,
176 including sailfin grouper (*Mycteroperca olfax*), locally known as "bacalao"; camotillo
177 (*Paralabrax albomaculatus*); brujo (*Pontinus clemens*); red spiny lobster (*Panulirus penicillatus*);
178 green spiny lobster (*P. gracilis*), and slipper lobster (*Scyllarides astori*). Several governmental
179 organizations have influenced the management of the GMR, mainly the Galapagos National Park
180 Directorate (Spanish acronym DPNG) and Galapagos Special Regime Governing Council
181 (Spanish acronym CGREG). Furthermore, diverse private organizations, non-governmental
182 organizations (NGOs), and research agencies have played a significant role in the assessment and
183 management of Galapagos small-scale fisheries, such as the Charles Darwin Foundation (CDF),

184 which has served as a scientific adviser for the Ecuadorian Government since the 1960s (Castrejón
185 et al., 2014).

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
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195 **Figure 1. Location map. Red square indicates the Galapagos Islands. While red circles**
 196 **indicate inhabited Islands.**

197 3.1 METHODS

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199 **3.1.1 Data Collection**

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201 The data collection coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, we limited face-to-face
202 research involving human participants. First, we created an online survey using Qualtrics
203 software, version 7.2020 (Copyright © [2020] Qualtrics). The survey served to input a series of
204 open-and closed-ended questions on the organizations' connectivity to other organizations and
205 agencies involved with assessing and managing the Galapagos small-scale fisheries sector and
206 store the answers of respondents of our study in the same database. Then, we undertook an
207 extensive literature review to examine the history, management, and interactions in the Galapagos
208 small-scale fishery system. Through this review, we created a list of public and private
209 organizations frequently associated with assessing and managing the Galapagos small-scale
210 fishery sector (in pre-COVID-19 pandemic conditions on the Galapagos Islands), including
211 fishery cooperatives, governmental organizations, NGOs, private organizations, municipal and
212 parish governments, and academic and research organizations. We used this list to interview
213 representatives and officials of these organizations (n = 38).

214

215 We reached out the representatives and officials of public and private organizations (n = 38) via
216 Zoom Video Communications Inc. (Zoom version 5.0.5) (n = 5), phone calls (n = 6), and emails
217 by sending the links of our online survey to the individuals' institutional email addresses) (n =
218 27). We read to the representatives and officials the open-and closed-ended questions that we
219 input in our Qualtrics survey during phone and Zoom interview calls, and we input their answers
220 into the database. Responses from the links sent to the individuals' institutional email addresses
221 were stored automatically in the Qualtrics database when respondents opened and completed the
222 open- and closed-ended questions of the online survey. We obtained verbal consent from the
223 participants at the beginning of each interview on Zoom and phone call. Informed consent was
224 obtained from the study participants, who were contacted through their institutional email
225 addresses when they opened the online survey. The study data were collected between June 2020
226 and November 2020. This study received ethics approval from our university's research ethics
227 committee (ORE #41927).

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234 **3.1.2 Data Analysis**

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236 Representatives from the public and private organizations noted in the data collection section were
237 asked to identify from the list: (1) the organizations they coordinate, communicate, or work with
238 regarding management and organization of the Galapagos small-scale fisheries sector, (2) how
239 often the interviewee's organization collaborates with the selected organizations—(a) frequently,
240 (b) occasionally or (c) rarely— (3) what organizational ties link the interviewee's organization
241 with selected organizations—(a) information exchange (e.g., regarding observations of
242 environmental change, coral reef condition, invasive species, water quality), (b) management
243 (e.g., mandatory organization and coordination of illegal fishing, monitoring, or user conflicts), or
244 (c) collaboration (e.g., joint projects, technical expertise, finances, or human resources) (see, the
245 organizational ties approach we based on in (3) in Alexander et al. (2017), and (4) the level and
246 sector of the interviewee's organization (local, national or international) / (public or private) (see
247 Appendix 1). We followed a snowball approach to conduct the interviews. Therefore, the
248 respondents were asked to suggest other organizations or groups (not listed in our list) with which
249 they coordinate, communicate, or work regarding the management and organization of the small-
250 scale fishing sector's activities.

251

252 We drew on a set of social network techniques to illustrate and elucidate the interactions of the
253 Galapagos small-scale fishing governance system. We used Gephi network visualization 0.9.2
254 software (Bastian et al., 2009) to (a) employ centrality measures to explore central nodes (in-
255 degree centrality), (b) visualize the frequency of institutional relationships between organizations
256 and agencies (frequent, occasional, or rare) and the nature of the relationship (information
257 exchange, management, or collaboration), and (c) employ centrality measures to identify bridging
258 nodes (betweenness centrality). We utilized PNet software to conduct an ERGMs analysis (Wang
259 et al., 2009). We used ERGMs, also known as p^* models, to explore whether or not specific
260 network patterns are prevalent in the Galapagos governance system network using a building
261 block approach. Figure 2 further explains this approach by presenting a series of building blocks
262 and a brief description of their associated governance challenges (hypotheses).

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
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Building blocks	Hypotheses	Governance processes
	<p>Hypothesis 1: Do organizations and agencies tend to reciprocate institutional links in the Galapagos small-scale fishing governance system?</p>	<p>Reciprocity effects: Mutual interaction between organizations and agencies (A ↔ B). From a governance perspective, mutual interaction between actors represents network structures that facilitate sharing information, expertise, resources, and common objectives in a governance network and provides the baseline for the evolution of collaboration links in a governance network.</p>
	<p>Hypothesis 2: Do organizations and agencies tend to direct organizational links to a popular node in the Galapagos small-scale fishing governance system?</p>	<p>Popularity effects: propensity in which links tend to direct to popular organizations and agencies in the network. From a collaborative governance perspective, popularity effects may facilitate coordination, the flow and spread of information within the network (Andrachuk et al., 2019).</p>
	<p>Hypothesis 3: Do organizations and agencies from the public sector tend to send more organizational links compared to others in the Galapagos small-scale fishing governance system?</p>	<p>Sender effects: propensity to send more links than others due to actors' attributes. From a governance perspective, tendencies to send more organizational links from the public sector than other economic sectors illustrate network configurations in which the public sector plays a predominant role in the management and organization in the governance system.</p>
	<p>Hypothesis 4: Do organizations and agencies from the public sector tend to receive more organizational links compared to others in the Galapagos small-scale fishing governance system?</p>	<p>Receiver effects: propensity to receive more links than others due to actors' attributes. From a governance perspective, a tendency in which organizations and agencies from the public sector tend to receive more organizational links than others illustrates an active involvement of the public sector in the governance network.</p>
	<p>Hypothesis 5: Do organizations and agencies from the public sector tend to have organizational links with actors from the same sector in the Galapagos small-scale fishing governance system?</p>	<p>Homophily: propensity to be attracted to those with similar network features. From a governance perspective, homophily based on the public sector illustrates network configurations that often represent obstacles for cross-level communication and collaboration as they hamper interactions across administrative levels.</p>

	<p>Hypothesis 6: Do organizations and agencies from the local level tend to send more organizational links than others in the Galapagos small-scale fishing governance system?</p>	<p>Sender effects: propensity to send more links than others due to actors' attributes. From a governance perspective, a tendency to send more organizational links than others from the local level illustrates network configurations in which local priorities, social memory, local knowledge and experience from the local level organizations and agencies probably circulate in the governance network.</p>
	<p>Hypothesis 7: Do organizations and agencies from the local level tend to receive more organizational links than others in in the Galapagos small-scale fishing governance system?</p>	<p>Receiver effects: propensity to receive more links than others due to actors' attributes. From a governance perspective, a tendency in which organizations and agencies from the local levels tend to receive more organizational links than others illustrates network configurations in which local-level organizations and agencies contribute and are considered in the management and organization of activities in the governance network.</p>
	<p>Hypothesis 8: Do organizations and agencies from the local level tend to have organizational links with actors from the same level in the Galapagos small-scale fishing governance system?</p>	<p>Homophily: propensity to be attracted to those with similar network features. From a governance perspective, homophily based on local levels illustrates network configurations that often represent obstacles for cross-level communication and collaboration across administrative as they limit horizontal and vertical linkages between the government and local resource users.</p>

271

272 Figure 2. Building blocks and their associated hypotheses used when estimating the propensity toward
273 reciprocity, popularity, and sender-and-receiver network formations within the Galapagos small-scale
274 fishery governance system. The building blocks represent well-defined network patterns linked to specific
275 governance concerns (hypotheses) (Bodin et al., 2014, 2016). These building blocks help to disclose how
276 frequent they are in a more extensive network of analysis (Bodin and Tengö, 2012). ERGMs provide a
277 platform where the hypotheses can be statistically examined (Lusher et al., 2012). Building blocks
278 associated with hypotheses 1 and 2: blue nodes represent organizations and agencies within the
279 Galapagos small-scale fishery governance. Building blocks associated with hypotheses 3 to 5: red nodes
280 represent organizations and agencies from the public sector, and blue nodes represent organizations and
281 agencies from the private sector in the network. Building blocks associated with hypotheses 6 to 8: green
282 nodes represent organizations and agencies from the local level, and yellow nodes represent non-local
283 level nodes in the network. See also the discussions regarding “building blocks,” also called “motifs” in
284 Milo et al. (2002) and their use in theoretical frameworks presented in Barnes et al. (2019); Bodin et al.
285 (2014); Bodin and Tengö (2012); Guerrero et al. (2015); Kininmonth et al. (2015) and Pittman and
286 Armitage (2017a)).

287

288

289 To estimate the presence of the building blocks presented in Figure 2 in the Galapagos small-scale
290 governance network, we first created an adjacency matrix from the interviewees' responses stored on

291 Qualtrics (i.e. a matrix of zeros and ones that indicates if nodes are connected (1) or not (0)
292 (Koskinen and Daraganova, 2012). In this matrix, using the representatives' and officials' answers
293 [noted in (1) in the data analysis section], a value of 1 indicated the existence of a link, and a value of
294 0 indicated the absence of a link. Furthermore, we created two attribute matrices according to the
295 nodes' attributes from the interviewees' responses [noted in (4) in the data analysis section], i.e. a
296 matrix that indicates the presence (1) or not (0) of an attribute of a node (Lusher and Robins, 2012a).
297 In the first matrix, the public sector nodes were set as 1, and the non-public sector nodes were set as
298 0. In the second matrix, local level nodes were set as 1, and the non-local level nodes as 0.

299

300 Using the matrices described above and setting structural parameters and actor attribute parameters
301 (see PNet parameters described in Figure 2 and Table 2), we estimated the tendency toward
302 reciprocity, popularity, and sender-and-receiver network formations within the Galapagos small-scale
303 fishery governance system (hypotheses/building blocks of Figure 2). We ran two models on PNet
304 software (see Table 2). We combined attribute parameters and structural parameters in our models to
305 include actors' attribute effects in the models (exogenous processes). We tested the fit by assessing if
306 our model parameters converged (t -statistic < 0.1) and had a good fit (goodness-of-fit (GOF) < 0.1
307 (Robins and Lusher, 2012).

308

309 **4.1 RESULTS**

310

311 Our results are divided into two parts. In the first, we present the Galapagos Islands' small-scale
312 fisheries network structure, connectivity, and organizational links by employing network statistics
313 (in-degree centrality, betweenness centrality) and connectivity tools. In the second, we present the
314 Galapagos Islands' small-scale fisheries network structure and connectivity by estimating parameters
315 (ERGMs).

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
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318 **4.1.1 Galapagos Islands' artisanal fisheries network**

319

320 Our results show that our interviewees identified 257 organizational links—comprised of 43 public
321 and private organizations at various levels and scales—connected to the Galapagos' small-scale
322 fishery sector (Figure 3) through management, exchange of information and collaboration. Often, the
323 organizations and agencies link to others through more than one organizational tie (Figure 4, Table
324 1). Of these 257 links, 101 associations were frequent, 123 were occasional, and 33 were rare (Figure
325 5, Table 1). Although visually, the network initially appeared centralized (i.e., the network is
326 organized around a central node), our results indicate that diverse organizations and agencies with
327 high in-degree centrality were present in the network (i.e., nodes receiving more institutional links
328 than others in the network, which means influential nodes in the network, considered by us as central

329 nodes) (Figure 3). These were: the governmental organizations GO02 and GO01, the fishing
 330 cooperative FC01, the governmental organization GO03, and the fishing cooperatives FC02, FC03
 331 and FC04, respectively. Our analysis of betweenness indicated that actors with high betweenness
 332 were present in the network (i.e., nodes often on the shortest paths between nodes in the network,
 333 meaning well-positioned nodes, deemed by us to be bridging nodes (Freeman, 1977)). These were:
 334 the governmental organization GO01, the non-governmental organization NGO01, the municipal
 335 government MG01, the fishing cooperatives FC02 and FC01, and the governmental organizations
 336 GO04 and GO02, respectively (Figure 6).




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338 **Figure 3. Central organizations of the Galapagos small-scale fishery governance network**

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340 Nodes indicate the organizations and agencies within the Galapagos small-scale fishery sector
 341 (GO = governmental organization, PO = private organization, FA = fishery association, NGO =
 342 non-governmental organization, MG = municipal government, PG = parish government, ARO =

343 academic and research organization). Node size indicates in-degree centrality. As the nodes'
344 dimension increases, it means that those nodes receive more organizational links than others in the
345 network, defined by us as central nodes. Node colour indicates level (green nodes = local level,
346 red nodes = national level, blue nodes = international level). Links indicate ties between
347 organizations and agencies linked with the Galapagos small-scale fishery sec




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350 **Figure 4. Type of organizational ties of the Galapagos small-scale fishery governance network**

351

352 Nodes indicate the organizations and agencies within the Galapagos small-scale fishery governance system shown in Figure 3. Node colour indicates level
353 (green nodes = local level, red nodes = national level, blue nodes = international level). As the nodes' dimension increases, those nodes possess higher in-
354 degree values than others in the network (see, Figure 3). The link colour indicates the organizational links between organizations and agencies linked with the

355 Galapagos small-scale fishery sector. 4A indicates links due to links due to collaboration. 4B indicates links due to management. 4C indicates links due to
356 information exchange. 4D indicates links due to information exchange and collaboration. 4E indicates links due to information exchange and management. 4F
357 links due to information exchange, management and collaboration nad 4G inidcates links due to managment and collaboration.
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


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Figure 5. Frequency of organizational ties of the Galapagos small-scale fishery governance network

Nodes indicate the organizations and agencies within the Galapagos small-scale fishery governance system shown in Figure 3. Node colour indicates level (green nodes = local level, red nodes = national level, blue nodes = international level). As the nodes' dimension increases, those nodes possess higher in-degree values than others in the network (see, Figure 3). The link colour indicates the frequency of organizational links between organizations and agencies linked with the Galapagos small-scale fishery sector. Black links in 5A represent frequent organizational links. Blue links in 5B represent occasional organizational links. Red links in 5C represent rare organizational links.

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Figure 6. Bridging organizations of the Galapagos small-scale fishery governance network

Nodes indicate the organizations and agencies within the Galapagos small-scale fishery sector (GO = governmental organization, PO = private organization, FA = fishery association, NGO = non-governmental organization, MG = municipal government, PG = parish government, ARO = academic and research organization). Links indicate the connections between organizations and agencies within the governance system. Node size indicates betweenness centrality. As nodes' dimension increases, it means that those nodes are often on the shortest paths between nodes in the network, defined by us as bridging nodes. Node colour indicates level (green nodes = local level, red nodes = national level, blue nodes = international level).

Statistic	Value
Number of nodes	43
Number of links	257
Number of frequent organizational links	101
Number of occasional organizational links	123
Number of rarely organizational links	33
Number of nodes from the public sector	21
Number of nodes from the private sector	22
Number of nodes from local level	21
Number of nodes from national level	12
Number of nodes from international level	10
Percentage of links due to information exchange	7.0
Percentage of links links due to management	31.91
Percentage of links due to collaboration	17.9
Percentage of links due to information exchange, management and collaboration	15.56
Percentage of links due to information exchange and management	3.5
Percentage of links due to information exchange and collaboration	12.06
Percentage of links due to management and collaboration	12.06

400

401 **Table 1. Overall network statistics description of the Galapagos small-scale fishery**
402 **governance system.** For interpretation purposes, the table breaks down the links and relationships
403 between 43 organizations and agencies within the Galapagos small-scale fishery governance system
404 network (a directed network, i.e. a governance system network in which all links do not necessarily
405 have to be reciprocal). There are organizations and agencies connected to others through more than
406 one organizational tie in the network.

407

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409 **4.1.2 Estimating parameters (ERGMs) to define network structure and connectivity artisanal**
410 **fisheries in the Galapagos Islands**

411

412 Our results indicated that the reciprocity between organizations and agencies was positive and
413 statistically significant, suggesting that organizations and agencies are likely to reciprocate
414 organizational links (hypothesis 1; Figure 2, Table 2). The A_{inS} parameter (popularity) is positive
415 and statistically significant, indicating there is a propensity to popular organizations and agencies in
416 the network, which relates to the in-degree distribution of the network (hypothesis 2; Figure 2,
417 Table 2). Estimates based on node attributes indicated that the public sector, and local level did not
418 influence the formation of associations. We did not find evidence of homophily based on the nodes'
419 attributes, either by the influence of the economic sector (public sector) or based on the local level

420 concerning the organizations' choice of partners to manage the activities of the Galapagos' artisanal
421 fishery sector (hypothesis 5 and 8; Figure 2, Table 2). There is a positive and significant sender
422 effect based on the public sector attribute, indicating a tendency for public-sector organizations and
423 agencies to send more organizational links, compared to others in the network (hypothesis 3; Figure
424 2, Table 2). We found no strong evidence that local organizations and agencies tend to send more
425 organizational links than others in the network (hypothesis 6; Figure 2, Table 2). Additionally, we
426 found no strong evidence that organizations and agencies from the public sector or local levels tend
427 to receive more organizational links than others in the network (hypothesis 4 and 7; Figure 2, Table
428 2). All the parameters we used converged (t -statistic < 0.1) and had a good fit (goodness-of-fit
429 (GOF) < 0.1) (Table 2).

430

Hypothesis	Parameter (PNet names)	Estimate	Standard error (ER)	T-statistics	Goodness-of-fit (GOF)
Model 1:					
-	Arc	-5.56	0.37	0.02*	-0.07
Hypothesis 1	Reciprocity	1.95	0.23	0.003*	-0.03
Hypothesis 2	AinS	1.69	0.21	0.01*	-0.07
Hypothesis 3	Sender (public sector)	0.66	0.23	0.09*	0.02
Hypothesis 4	Receiver (public sector)	-0.14	0.20	-0.04	-0.10
Hypothesis 5	Interaction/ Homophily (public sector)	0.19	0.25	0.01	-0.004
Model 2:					
-	Arc	-2.46	0.15	0.09*	0.04
Hypothesis 1	Reciprocity	2.01	0.24	0.04*	0.04
Hypothesis 6	Sender (local level)	0.23	0.22	0.09	0.06
Hypothesis 7	Receiver (local level)	0.20	0.21	0.05	0.05
Hypothesis 8	Interaction/ Homophily (local level)	0.21	0.26	0.05	0.05

431

432 **Table 2. ERGM results.** A t-statistic < 0.1 indicates a converged model. GOF indicates how
433 well the model captured features of the data. $GOF < 0.1$ indicates a good fit. * Indicates a
434 significant parameter. Positive or negative values indicate more or less than the network
435 configuration, respectively. Arc parameter ($A \rightarrow B$) provides the baseline for the occurrence of
436 associations (Lusher and Robins, 2012b; Robins and Lusher, 2012).

438 5.1 DISCUSSION

439

440 We argue that the extent of the effects of multiple and simultaneous drivers of change on social-
441 ecological systems forces governance systems to explore ways of coping with unexpected drivers
442 of change and building adaptive capacity. We argue that among the diverse factors contributing to
443 building adaptive capacity in complex social-ecological systems, including financial support,
444 technology, and local knowledge, an understanding of network configurations of governance
445 systems is increasingly a factor to be considered in building adaptive capacity (Adger, 2003;
446 Barnes et al., 2017; Cinner et al., 2018). Governance systems actors often determine and set,
447 among other things, the legal rights to resources and support or compensation mechanisms in
448 society (Kooiman, 2003). Therefore, the study of governance systems becomes a cornerstone
449 component of analysis in solving different multi-scale social-ecological problems and
450 consequently a significant determinant in building adaptive capacity in complex social-ecological
451 systems (Angst, 2019) such as the Galapagos small-scale fishing system.

452

453 The adverse consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are a vivid example of how unexpected
454 and rapid changes can challenge the Galapagos governance system and suddenly affect people's
455 wellbeing and livelihoods. The pandemic has pushed the Galapagos small-scale fishing sector into
456 the worst ever socio-economic situation experienced in the history of this archipelago, making
457 evident the necessity of a more holistic form of governance to deal with the complex social-
458 ecological interactions spanning the fishery sector. We argue that those organizations responding
459 to the wicked transboundary problems that the Galapagos small-scale fishing sector faces need to
460 build an enabling environment to act during periods of change. No previous research has
461 evaluated the small-scale fishing governance system network of the Galapagos Islands. Therefore,
462 an initial understanding of how the collaborative governance network of the Galapagos small-
463 scale fishing system behaves forms a vital baseline for enhancing the collective efforts, policies,
464 and adaptive capacity in the fishery sector.

465

466 Illegal international fishing, climate change and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are the
467 main drivers of change affecting the Galapagos small-scale fishing system. From a governance
468 perspective, much of the effectiveness of problem-solving amidst multiple societal concerns rely
469 on the governance system's ability to coordinate and establish rules and laws that prevent a misfit
470 between the governance system and the societal problems that arise (Pittman et al., 2015). This
471 capacity in the Galapagos co-management system currently depends on the system's ability to fit
472 with environmental, biological, and ecological issues and various societal concerns and
473 stakeholders' expectations (see also the arguments on achieving multiple socio-ecological
474 institutional fits and social fit put forward by Ishihara et al. (2021) and Acton et al. (2021).

475

476 Our results suggest that organizations and agencies within the Galapagos small-scale fishing
477 governance system network interact through diverse organizational links emerging from the
478 exchange of information, management, and collaboration (Figure 4, Figure 5, Table 1). Notably,
479 our outcomes indicate that the organizations and agencies within the network often link to others
480 through one or more organizational ties at once. Linkages associated with a) management, b)
481 collaboration, c) information exchange, management and collaboration, d) information exchange
482 and collaboration, and e) management and collaboration were the most prominent linkages in the
483 network (Table 1). Although our centrality analysis focused on the whole network connectivity,
484 regardless of the nature of organizations and agencies links, it must be noted that the local-level
485 government organizations GO02 and GO01, the national-level governmental organization GO03,
486 and the local-level fishing cooperatives FC03, FC04 and FC01, respectively, are central nodes in
487 links emerging from management. The local-level governmental organizations GO02 and GO01,
488 the local-level fishing cooperative FC01, the national-level governmental organization GO03 and
489 the local-level fishing cooperatives FC03 and FC04, respectively, are central nodes in relations
490 arising from the collaboration. The local-level governmental organization GO02, the national-
491 level governmental organization GO03 and the local-level governmental organization GO01 are
492 central nodes in links emerging from the exchange of information.

493

494 We consider these network configurations to be interesting characteristics of collaborative
495 governance. Therefore, we argue that if these network features are seen and agreed upon more
496 strategically between organizations and agencies according to their nature and needs, and are
497 activated when social-ecological interactions and social concerns unfold, they are valuable
498 benchmarks to align strategies, coordinate solutions, and harmonize policy-making processes in
499 the sector, particularly in times of abrupt changes. This capacity is referred to in the literature as
500 "sleeping nodes and links" (Janssen et al., 2005). Organizational links should strategically align
501 more closely with the sector's social-ecological interactions and societal needs than with actors'
502 institutional objectives and affiliations in the governance system. Addressing the adverse location-
503 specific drivers of change that define the state of social-ecological systems (Smit and Wandel,
504 2006; Wisner et al., 2004) depends in part on the effectiveness of governance systems to
505 reconfigure, adapt to change and approximate as closely as possible their management scale with
506 the social-ecological interdependencies scale (Folke et al., 2007; Kininmonth et al., 2015; Pittman
507 and Armitage, 2017b). Therefore, we argue that exploring the network interdependencies and
508 patterns of collaborative networks more strategically would enable devising novel governance
509 arrangements and updating joint efforts aimed towards a desirable future in the sector (Armitage
510 et al., 2007).

511

512 Our ERGM's outcomes suggest a positive and significant tendency of organizations and agencies
513 to reciprocate links (hypothesis 1; Figure 2, Table 2). We consider this an essential feature in the
514 Galapagos small-scale fishery collaborative network, as mutual organizational links between
515 organizations and agencies within governance systems play a significant role in sharing
516 information, expertise, resources, objectives, and collaborative network links' evolution.
517 Governance systems' adaptive capacity largely depends on their capacity to act collectively.
518 Therefore, positive reciprocal effects in the network ($A \leftrightarrow B$) can potentially lead to the
519 incorporation of a new third collaboration party (C) in reciprocal organizational links, giving rise
520 to new strategic collaborative alliances. This means, in other words, that it is likely that a
521 collaboration partner of my partner may become my collaboration partner (Pittman and Armitage,
522 2017b), making reciprocal action a significant condition to improve the Galapagos collaborative
523 network and include organizations and stakeholder groups that often possess critical local
524 knowledge and know beforehand what the local priorities, which facilitates building adaptive
525 capacity in a location-specific context.

526

527 The results indicate a positive effect but nonsignificant for homophily and receiver effects,
528 suggesting no solid statistical evidence of homophily (hypotheses 5 and 8; Figure 2, Table 2) and
529 receiver effects (hypotheses 4 and 7; Figure 2, Table 2) based on the nodes' attributes, either by
530 the influence of the economic sector (public) or based on the local level regarding the
531 organizations' choice of partners to manage the activities of the Galapagos small-scale fishery
532 sector. We argue that this can be perceived as an interesting feature for cooperation and building
533 adaptive capacity in the Galapagos fishery sector if one considers the value of cross-level and
534 cross-sectoral interaction (Carlisle and Gruby, 2019; Ostrom, 2010) and the principle of
535 subsidiarity (Marshall, 2008) when managing common interests. Effective responses to rapid and
536 transboundary multidimensional changes require the interaction of various actors at different
537 levels – from the local to the international – in which all decision-making structures must take
538 action within their mandates in a coordinated way to strategically cope with the effects of
539 multidimensional problems facing socio-ecological systems (Armitage et al., 2007; Bixler et al.,
540 2016). Acknowledging that local fishing communities have a close link with their environment –
541 i.e. a link that allows them to capture what often cannot be perceived by the scientific community
542 and decision-making structures – and that the subsidiarity principle ensures that decisions are
543 made as close as possible to those whose livelihoods might be affected by decision-making, are
544 crucial in adaptive capacity building.

545

546 Although we found no strong evidence that organizations and agencies from the local levels tend
547 to send more organizational links than others in the network (hypothesis 6; Figure 2, Table 2),
548 outcomes concerning sender effects suggest that organizations and agencies from the public sector

549 are more likely to send organizational links than others in the Galapagos small-scale fishery sector
550 (hypothesis 3; Figure 2, Table 2). This, from our view, may be interpreted to mean that the public
551 sector plays a predominant role in defining management and organization in the Galapagos small-
552 scale fisheries sector, reflecting the Galapagos' reality closely if we consider the dominant role
553 that central and local governmental institutions have played historically in the policy
554 implementation and coordination in the sector.

555

556 Our results also suggest tendencies for centralization (in-degree distributions) in the Galapagos
557 small-scale fishing sector network (hypothesis 2; Figure 2, Table 2). This, from our perspective,
558 may be seen as another important feature of analysis in the sector, bearing in mind that a popular
559 position in a social network might signify a more considerable impact on social-ecological
560 systems. Organizations and stakeholders involved in governance system structures can provide
561 incentives to both ease changing conditions and increase them (Armitage et al., 2011). Thus,
562 probably, some central and bridging organizations and agencies can potentially become significant
563 catalyzers and intermediaries that connect actors and groups at different geographical and
564 jurisdictional scales and levels in the network, which, with an understanding of the benefits of
565 exploring multilevel interactions and polycentrism in times of abrupt and sudden changes,
566 contribute to enhancing collaborative governance networks. On the one hand, improved
567 connectivity and collaboration between such nodes might provide platforms in the network to
568 foster participation and knowledge sharing that account for local priorities and social memory. On
569 the other hand, improved connectivity and collaboration among important nodes in the network
570 can provide platforms for building trust, and social capital that might serve to alleviate the
571 frequent tensions and disputes that arise in Galapagos small-scale fishing management.

572


573 It is critical to recognize that managing complex social-ecological systems involving a few actors
574 is a challenging, if not impossible, endeavour. This is particularly true in rigid co-management
575 systems where actors are often stipulated and defined by policies and laws, limiting connectivity,
576 flexibility and experimentation across sectors, levels and scales. Therefore, the initial idea of
577 governance systems management based solely on collaboration (co-management concept) should
578 be expanded in scope. This approach should echo the adaptive co-management approaches
579 proposed by other research (Armitage et al., 2009; Clark and Clarke, 2011; Dietz et al., 2003;
580 Folke et al., 2005). The multiple socio-ecological interactions that exist in small-scale fisheries in
581 the Galapagos require cooperation and experimentation (learning by doing) that take place in
582 different decision-making centres. Central and bridging organizations and agencies in the network
583 (e.g. CGREG, DPNG, fishing cooperatives, CDF) that operate at local, national and international
584 levels and possess connections to governmental organizations, NGOs, funding organizations and
585 local resource-users play a significant role in this regard.

25

586

587 Bolstering the capacity of a socio-ecological system at the local scale to adapt is highly dependent
588 on correcting errors by adjusting attitudes and behaviours (double-loop learning, i.e., adjusting
589 errors through values and policies), for example, by building social capital rather than changing
590 individual resource management strategies and actions (single-loop learning, i.e., correcting
591 mistakes from routines) (Armitage et al., 2008). An example of the latter approach would be
592 repetitive conflicts between conservationists and local fishers regarding fishing techniques.
593 Management of common-pool resources requires nodes to provide leadership and vision among
594 the stakeholders. Central and bridging nodes occupy important positions in social networks,
595 making them significant actors for creating synergies among stakeholders in a network (Figure 7)
596 (Berdej and Armitage, 2016; Olsson et al., 2006). Their influential positions in social networks
597 enable them to not only bring together organizations and agencies from various sectors but also to
598 link significant inputs such as knowledge, resources, technical expertise and best practices to deal
599 with unexpected and rapid changes that occur at various scales and levels (Armitage et al., 2017;
600 Bodin and Crona, 2009; Folke et al., 2005). In this context, the effect of central and bridging
601 nodes goes beyond merely bridging together stakeholders and exchanging information and goals.
602 Central and bridging nodes play a significant role in approximating as closely as possible the
603 resource governance scale to the extent of social-ecological system dynamics and prevent a misfit
604 between the social-ecological dimensions, social values and needs (Figure 8), see discussion in
605 Olsson et al. (2007) and Ishihara et al. (2021). At the same time, they are essential catalyzers for
606 building social capital and trust, access to information, co-production of knowledge, conflict
607 resolution, the incorporation of local priorities and collaborative learning (Berardo and Scholz,
608 2010; Folke et al., 2005; Hahn et al., 2006), features that we deem critical in collaborative
609 approaches to bolster the capacity of complex social-ecological systems to adapt.

610




611

612 **Figure 7. Central nodes and bridging nodes**

613 The black dotted line indicates the governance system. Nodes indicate the organizations and
 614 agencies within the governance system. The arrows indicate the organizational links between
 615 organizations and agencies within the governance system. As the nodes' dimension increases, it
 616 signifies that those organizations and agencies receive more institutional links than others in the
 617 network (nodes with higher in-degree centrality values compared to the rest of nodes in the
 618 network), deemed by us as central nodes. The blue nodes indicate those organizations and
 619 agencies that are often on the shortest paths between organizations and agencies in the governance
 620 system network, deemed by us as bridging nodes (nodes with higher betweenness centrality values
 621 compared to the rest of nodes in the network). Linking diverse actors across geographical scales
 622 and administrative levels often poses one of the most significant challenges in managing common-
 623 pool resources. Bridging and central nodes usually contribute to having a more densely clustered
 624 collaboration network. Often, they serve as channels for communication and intermediaries to
 625 connect separated organizations and agencies across geographical scales and management levels
 626 in a governance system.

627

628



629

630 **Figure 8. The problem of fit** (based on Olsson et al. (2007))

631 The black dotted line indicates the governance system. The red dotted line indicates the
 632 geographical and functional scale spanning social-ecological dimensions. Nodes indicate the
 633 organizations and agencies within the governance system. The arrows indicate the organizational
 634 links between organizations and agencies within the governance system. As the size of the nodes
 635 increases, it indicates organizations and agencies receiving more organizational links, defined by
 636 us as central nodes. Blue nodes indicate organizations and agencies within the governance system
 637 on the shortest paths to all other nodes, defined as bridging nodes. A governance misfit often
 638 occurs because the spatial and functional scale of a social-ecological system (red dotted line) goes
 639 beyond the management scope of the governance system (black dotted line). Addressing the
 640 problem of fit from a governance perspective involves, among other things, addressing various
 641 complex social-ecological problems at the appropriate timing, geographical and functional scales.
 642 See the discussions regarding governance fit put forward by Pittman et al. (2015) and Epstein et
 643 al. (2015).

644

645

646 6.1 CONCLUSIONS

647

648 To our knowledge, this paper is the first study in the Galapagos Islands that aims at studying the
 649 collaborative governance system of the Galapagos small-scale fishery using a social network
 650 approach. The results presented in this paper highlight that the use of social network approaches
 651 through network statistics approaches and ERGMs are valuable tools when analyzing
 652 collaborative processes through social network analysis from place-specific perspectives. We
 653 argue that if the aim is to strengthen governance systems, both network statistics approaches and
 654 ERGMs enable decision-makers to make decisions. On the one hand, network statistics allow
 655 decision-makers to make initial decisions by understanding critical actors in the network, existing
 656 collaboration frequency and organizational links that occur in a network. On the other hand,
 657 ERGMs allow decision-makers to undertake more profound investigations by understanding more

658 specific interdependencies occurring in a network by incorporating structural and attribute
659 variables in the analysis, enabling a further explanation of a social network configuration and the
660 formation of links.

661

662 Our results suggest that various organizations and agencies from different sectors and levels
663 interact in the Galapagos small-scale fishing sector network. Therefore, considering the value of
664 social network approaches in adaptive capacity research on socio-ecological systems, we suggest
665 this paper may guide future theoretical frameworks that strengthen the Galapagos small-scale
666 fishing governance network. We recognize the need to align the Galapagos small-scale fishery
667 governance system presented in this study with the collaboration links, relationships and
668 interdependencies formed during the COVID-19 pandemic in the sector. The unprecedented
669 nature of the coronavirus variants must have accelerated the creation of collaboration links in the
670 sector. Thus, we argue that the experience gained in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic
671 would allow the formulation of additional inputs for enhancing the Galapagos small-scale fishing
672 governance system network and the sector's scientific development from collaboration and social
673 network analysis, in addition to opening further discussions on the governance system's capacity
674 to align management with the complex social-ecological interactions occurring in the sector.

675

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682

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